The tide of global debt has peaked: 8 charts suggest what may happen next, as the tide retreats

The results of the central bankers’ great experiment with money printing are now in, and they are fairly depressing, as the charts above confirm:

  • On the left are the IMF’s annual forecasts from 2010 – 2018 (dotted lines) and the actual result (black)
  • Until recently, the Fund was convinced the world would soon see 5% GDP growth, or at least 4% growth
  • The actual outcome has been a steady decline until 2017 and this month’s forecast sees slowing growth by 2020

As the IMF headlined last week,current favorable growth rates will not last”.

  • On the right, is the amount of money the bankers have spent on money printing to achieve this result
  • China, the US, Japan, the Eurozone and the Bank of England printed over $30tn between 2009-2017
  • So far, only China – which did 2/3rds of the printing, has admitted its mistake, and changed the policy

The chart above shows what happens if you spend a lot of money without getting much return in terms of growth.  Again from the IMF, it shows that total global debt has risen to $164tn.  This is more than twice the size of global GDP – 225%, to be exact, based on latest 2016 data.  The IMF analysis also highlights the result of the money printing:

“Debt-to-GDP ratios in advanced economies are at levels not seen since World War II….In the last ten years, emerging market economies have been responsible for most of the increase. China alone contributed 43% to the increase in global debt since 2007. In contrast, the contribution from low income developing countries is barely noticeable.”

It doesn’t take a rocket scientist to work out the result of this failed policy, which is shown in the above IMF charts:

  • Global debt to GDP levels are higher than in 2008 and in the financial crisis; only World War 2 was higher
  • Debt ratios in the advanced economies are at their highest since the 1980s debt crisis
  • Emerging market ratios are lower (apart from China), but this is because of debt forgiveness at the Millennium

CAN ALL THIS DEBT EVER BE PAID PACK?  AND IF NOT, WHAT HAPPENS?
As everyone knows, borrowing is easy.  Almost all governments and commentators have lined up since 2009 to support the money-printing policy.  But the hard bit happens now as it starts to become obvious that the policy has failed.

We now have all the debt, but we don’t have the growth that would enable it to be paid off.

It would be easy to simply end here, and point out that John Richardson and I set out the reasons why money-printing could never work in 2011, when we published Boom, Gloom and the New Normal: How the Ageing of the BabyBoomers is Changing Demand Patterns, Again.  Our conclusion then was essentially based on common sense:

Central bankers simply confused cause and effect: demographics drive the economy, not monetary policy. 

Common sense tells us that young populations create a demographic dividend as their spending grows with their incomes.  But today’s ageing Western populations have a demographic deficit: older people already own most of what they need,and their incomes decline as they enter retirement.

But having been right in the past doesn’t help to solve today’s problem of excess debt and leverage:

  • Common sense also tells us that leverage equals risk – if it works out, everything is fine; if not…..
  • If you have a lot of debt and the world moves into recession, it becomes very hard to repay the debt

Financial markets are doing their best to warn us that the problems are growing.  Longer-term interest rates, which are not controlled by the central banks, have been rising for some time. They are telling us that some investors are no longer simply chasing yield.  They are instead worrying about risk – and whether their loan will actually be repaid.

Essentially, we are now in the and-game for stimulus policies.  Major debt restructuring is now inevitable – either on an organised basis, as set out by Bill White, the only central banker to warn of the 2008 Crisis – or more chaotically.

This restructuring is going to be painful, as the chart above on the impact of leverage confirms.  I originally highlighted it in August 2007, as the Crisis began to unfold – unfortunately, it now seems to have become relevant again..

PLEASE DON’T FIND YOURSELF SWIMMING NAKED WHEN THE TIDE OF DEBT GOES OUT 
Leverage makes people appear to be geniuses on the way up.  But on the way down, Warren Buffett’s famous warning is worth remembering: “Only when the tide goes out do you discover who’s been swimming naked”.

 

*Return on Equity is the fundamental measure of a company’s profitability, and is defined as the amount of profit or net income a company earns per investment dollar. 

The post The tide of global debt has peaked: 8 charts suggest what may happen next, as the tide retreats appeared first on Chemicals & The Economy.

Trump’s trade war should set warning bells ringing for every company and investor

There should be no surprise that President Trump has launched his trade war with China.  The real surprise is that financial markets, and business leaders, are so surprised it is happening.  He was, after all, elected on a platform that called for a trade war, as I noted originally back in November 2016 – and many times since, even just last month.

Nor is it a surprise that China has chosen to target chemicals in its proposed list of products for retaliation. As my colleague John Richardson has noted:

“On Tuesday, China’s reaction to that first round of $50bn US tariffs included proposed tariffs of 25% on US exports of low and linear-low density polyethylene.  The same tariffs could also be levied on US polycarbonate, polyvinyl chloride, plastic products in general, acrylonitrile, catalysts, lubricants, epoxy resin, acrylic polymers, vinyl polymers, polyamides (nylon) and surfactants.”

China, unlike almost everyone else it seems, has used the past 15 months to prepare for Trump’s trade war.  So they are naturally targeting the chemicals industry – which was a great supporter of Trump in the early days, and has also come to depend on China for much of its growth.

They will have seen this December 2016 photo of Dow Chemicals CEO, Andrew Liveris, joining Trump at a victory rally in Michigan.

They will also have read Liveris’ tribute to the new President, when announcing the opening of a new R&D centre in Michigan:

“This decision is because of this man and these policies,” Mr. Liveris said from the stage of the 6,000-seat Deltaplex Arena here, adding, “I tingle with pride listening to you.”

The fact that Liveris stepped down last year as head of Trump’s manufacturing council will also have been noticed in Beijing, but clearly did not change their strategy.

FINANCIAL MARKETS EXPECT THE  FED TO BE A FAIRY GODMOTHER
Industry now has a few weeks left to plan for the inevitable.  But if history is any guide, many business people will fail to take advantage of this narrowing window of opportunity.  Instead, like most investors, they will continue with “business as usual”.  The problem is simple:

  • A whole generation has grown up expecting the central banks to act as a fairy godmother
  • Whenever markets have moved downwards, Fed Chairmen and others have showered them with cash
  • Therefore the winning strategy for the past 20 years and more has been to “buy on the dips”
  • Similarly, industry no longer bothers with genuine scenario analysis, where bad things can and do happen

Another key factor in this developing drama is that not all the actors are equally important.  China seems to have been initially wrong-footed, for example, by placing its trust in Treasury Secretary, Steve Mnuchin, and US Ambassador to China, Terry Branstad, to argue its case.  They might appear on paper to be the right people to lobby, but at the end of the day, they are simply messengers – not the ones deciding policy.

The key people are the US Trade Representative, Robert Lighthizer, and his aide, Peter Navarro.  They are now being joined by arch-hawk John Bolton, who in his role as National Security Advisor can be expected to play a key role – along with newly appointed Secretary of State, Mike Pompeo.   Like everything in the Trump White House, Lighthizer’s power comes from his relationship with the President, as the Wall Street Journal describes:

“To Mr. Trump, Mr. Lighthizer was a kindred spirit on trade—and one who shuns the limelight. The two men, who have a similar chip-on-the-shoulder sense of humor, bonded. Mr. Lighthizer caught rides to his Florida home on Air Force One. Mr. Trump summons Mr. Lighthizer regularly to the Oval Office to discuss trade matters, administration officials say.

THE NEXT 6 MONTHS WILL BE A WAKE-UP CALL FOR MANY
The past 18 months have in many ways been a repeat of the 2007-8 period, when I was told my warnings of a subprime crisis were simply alarmist.  This complacency even lasted into October 2008, after the Lehman collapse, when senior executives were still telling me the problems were “only financial” and wouldn’t impact “the real world”.

Similarly, I have been told since September 2015, when I first began warning of the dangers posed by populism in the US and Europe, that I “didn’t understand”. It was clear, I was told, that Trump could “never” become the Republican candidate and could “never ever” become President – and if he did, then Congress would “never ever ever” allow him to take charge of trade policy.  Similarly, I was being told in March 2016 that the UK would “never” vote for Brexit.

I also understand why so many friends and colleagues have been blindsided by these developments, as I discussed in the same September 2015 post:

“The economic success of the BabyBoomer-led SuperCycle meant that politics as such took a back seat. People no longer needed to argue over “who got what” as there seemed to be plenty for everyone. But today, those happy days are receding into history – hence the growing arguments over inequality and relative income levels.

“Companies and investors have had little experience of how such debates can impact them in recent decades. They now need to move quickly up the learning curve. Political risk is becoming a major issue, as it was before the 1990s.”

TIME TO DEVELOP PROPER SCENARIOS ANALYSIS
Nobody can forecast everything in detail over the next 6 months, let alone the next few years.  And it is very easy to mock if one detail of the scenario analysis turns out to be wrong.  But the point of scenario analysis is not to try and forecast every detail.  It is instead to give you time to prepare, and to think of alternative strategies.

Just imagine, for example, if you had taken seriously my September 2015 warning about the rise of populism:

  • Think about all the decisions you wouldn’t have made, if you had really believed that Trump could become President and Brexit could happen in the UK?
  • Think of all the decisions you would have made instead, to create options in case these developments occurred?

I understand that you may worry about being mocked for being “stupid” and “alarmist”.  But you should simply remind the mockers of the lesson learnt by insurer Aetna’s CEO, from his failure to undertake proper scenario analysis, as he described in November 2016:

“When Aetna ran through post-election expectations, the idea that Donald J. Trump would win the presidency and that Republicans would control both chambers of Congress seemed so implausible that it was not even in play.  We started with a fresh piece of paper yesterday — we had no idea how to approach it. What we would have spent months doing if we thought it was even remotely possible, we had to do in a day.” 

There is no doubt that he was the one feeling stupid, then.

 

 

The post Trump’s trade war should set warning bells ringing for every company and investor appeared first on Chemicals & The Economy.

Trump’s trade war hits Wall Street as tech downturn begins

President Trump no longer tweets regularly about new record highs for US financial markets.

The tweets were a core activity in the first year of his Presidency, when he was still feeling his way into the job.

But now, as last week’s sackings of his Secretary of State and National Security Advisor confirm, his focus has returned to the promises made in his Gettysburg speech, before the election:

“I will begin taking the following 7 actions to protect American workers (my emphasis and status unpdate):

FIRST, I will announce my intention to renegotiate NAFTA or withdraw from the deal under Article 2205 – UNDERWAY
SECOND, I will announce our withdrawal from the Trans-Pacific Partnership – DONE
THIRD, I will direct my Secretary of the Treasury to label China a currency manipulator – TRADE WAR NOW BEGUN
FOURTH, I will direct the Secretary of Commerce and U.S. Trade Representative to identify all foreign trading abuses that unfairly impact American workers and direct them to use every tool under American and international law to end those abuses immediately – UNDERWAY
FIFTH, I will lift the restrictions on the production of $50 trillion dollars’ worth of job-producing American energy reserves, including shale, oil, natural gas and clean coal– UNDERWAY
SIXTH, lift the Obama-Clinton roadblocks and allow vital energy infrastructure projects, like the Keystone Pipeline, to move forward – UNDERWAY
SEVENTH, cancel billions in payments to U.N. climate change programs and use the money to fix America’s water and environmental infrastructure – WITHDRAWN FROM UN CLIMATE CHANGE PROGRAMME”

Trump knows he faces a tough fight in November’s mid-term elections, when the Democrats could win control of Congress.  So he is refocusing on the issues that won him the White House in 2016. As I noted before his Inauguration:

“If President Trump pursues the policy program on which he was elected, we are therefore about to live through a paradigm shift in America’s role in the world. This is his right as President, and America’s right as a free country. But it is critical that all of us recognise the change about to take place.

This programme is quite different from the historical Republican platform focused on free trade and sound money.

The comparison between President Reagan’s 1986 tax reform and Trump’s tax cut last year highlights the different agenda.  Reagan built consensus over 3 years, and ensured his reform was revenue neutral. Trump simply used the Republican majority to force through the tax cut, and ignored warnings that it could add $1tn+ to the deficit.

FINANCIAL MARKETS HAVE BEGUN TO TUMBLE AS THE FAANGS’ MARKETS MATURE
Wall Street has had a great run, as the chart of Prof Robert Shiller’s CAPE Index confirms.

Its Price/Earnings ratio peaked in January at 33.6 – even higher than 1929’s top of 32.6.  Only the dot-com bubble at the end of the Boomer SuperCycle was higher, at 44.2.

Essentially, markets have been operating on the “5 Everyone concept”© .  There are 3 core “Everyones”:

  • “Everyone knows” stocks are over-valued, but believes they are clever enough to spot when it is time to exit
  • “Everyone believes” the Federal Reserve will always rescue them, if markets did happen to tumble
  • “Everyone assumes” that every correction is therefore a buying opportunity, as markets can never fall

But since January, the benchmark S&P 500 Index has seen these “3 Everyones” start to be questioned:

  • It peaked at 2839 in January, and by February “Everyone assumed” its 2581 level was a “buying opportunity”
  • But the March peak was just 2783, and prices then tumbled to 2588 on Friday
  • If prices now go below 2581, then they risk trending much lower, with “lower highs and lower lows”

The key issue is the growing doubt over the outlook for the super-hot tech sector, and the FAANG tech stocks.  This challenges the 4th “Everyone” – that “Everyone agrees” Facebook, Apple, Amazon, Netflix, Google (and Chinese companies such as Alibaba and Tencent), will dominate the global economy for decades ahead.

Last year, as the Financial Times chart confirms, the world’s Top 7 companies by market value were all tech-based.

But what if this idea is wrong?  Can tech really continue to grow to the sky, or are its markets starting to mature?

  • We know, for example, that the smartphone market has peaked, as I discussed last month
  • Price competition is also intensifying as companies focus on market share, not profit
  • Apple CEO Tim Cook is also very worried by the potential impact of trade wars
  • Can Apple and its rivals continue to increase their earnings, given these challenges?

Similarly, the growing political storm over Facebook suggests its days of stellar revenue and profit growth are ending.

Questions are also being raised about the viability of tech’s business model, which depends on users giving up their personal information for free.

After all, history shows that even the highest-flying companies and markets eventually mature.  At that point, Price/ Earnings ratios begin to drop, and investors start to refocus on dividend payments instead.

Unfortunately for Wall Street, it seems that Trump’s attack on free trade may turn out to be the catalyst for their discovery that tech’s days of exponential growth are over.

INVESTORS FACE 5TH “EVERYONE” CHALLENGE, AS “EVERYONE REALISES” MARKETS HAVE PEAKED
Trade wars are not normally good for business.  Nor is political uncertainty – which is certain to rise as President Trump energises core voters ahead of the mid-terms.  His Gettysburg policies set out, after all, “to protect American workers“.

If Trump’s initial focus on financial markets was indeed purely tactical, markets now have a bumpy ride ahead. The risk is that gradually, a 5th “Everyone” will become apparent – that “Everyone realises” markets have peaked.

The post Trump’s trade war hits Wall Street as tech downturn begins appeared first on Chemicals & The Economy.

West faces “demographic deficit” as populations age

Rising life expectancy, and falling fertility rates, mean that a third of the Western population is now in the low spending 55-plus age group.  Given that consumer spending is around two-thirds of the economy in developed countries, the above charts provide critically important information on the prospects for economic growth.

They show official data for household spending in 3 of the major G7 economies in 2017 – the USA, Japan and the UK:

  • Each country reports on a slightly different basis in terms of age range and headings, but the basics are similar
  • US spending peaks in the 45 – 54 age group: Japanese spending peaks at age 55; UK spending peaks at age 50
  • After the age of 75, US spending falls 46% from its peak and UK spend falls 53%: after the age of 70, Japanese spending falls 34%

The data confirms the common sense conclusion that youthful populations create a potential demographic dividend in terms of economic growth.  Conversely, ageing populations have a demographic deficit and will see lower growth, as.older people already own most of what they need, and their incomes go down as they enter retirement.

The Western world has been, and still is, a classic case study for this demographic effect in action, as the second chart shows:

  • In 1950, only 16% of Westerners were in the New Old 55-plus age group; 39% were in the 25-54 age group that drives economic growth and wealth creation; and 45% were under 25 as the BabyBoom got underway
  • But by 2015, the percentage of New Olders had doubled to 31%, whilst the percentage of Wealth Creators was virtually unchanged at 41% and only 28% were under 25 (as fertility rates collapsed after 1970)

The Boomers were the largest and wealthiest generation that the world has ever seen, and as they joined the workforce they created an economic Super-Cycle. This was turbo-charged by the fact that, for the first time in history, Western women began to re-enter the workforce after childbirth:

  • In the US, for example, women’s participation rate nearly doubled from 34% in 1950 to a peak of 60% in 1999
  • And after the Equal Pay Act of 1963, their earnings rose to 62% of men’s by 1979 and to 81% by 2005 (since when it has flatlined)

But since 2001, the oldest Boomer, born in 1946, has been leaving the Wealth Creator age group.  By 2013, the average Boomer had left it.  And since 1970, Western fertility rates have been below replacement levels (2.1 babies/woman).  So the Western economy now faces a double squeeze:

  • The Boomers who created the SuperCycle are no longer making a major contribution to economic growth
  • The number of new Wealth Creators is now relatively smaller, due to the collapse of fertility rates

In the past, very few Boomers would have lived beyond retirement age, as the 3rd chart confirms based on UN Population Division data.  So, sadly, they would have been irrelevant in terms of economic growth.  But, wonderfully, this is no longer true today:

  • In 1950, average US life expectancy for men was just 66 years and 72 years for women.  UK men died at age 67, and women at age 72.  Japanese men died at age 61, and women at age 65
  • Today, US men are living an extra 11 years and women 9 years more.  UK men are living an extra 12 years and women 11 years more.  Japanese men are living an extra 19 years and women 22 years more
  • By 2030, the UN forecasts suggest US men will be living 20% longer than in 1950, and women 16% longer.  In the UK, men will be living 23% longer and women 18% longer.  In Japan, men will be living 35% longer, and women 37% longer

By 2030, 36% of the Western population will be New Olders, almost equal to the 37% who are Wealth Creators.

Clearly there is no going back to SuperCycle growth levels.  I will look at this critical issue in more detail next week.

 

The post West faces “demographic deficit” as populations age appeared first on Chemicals & The Economy.

China’s role in market volatility – Beijing’s shifting priorities raise questions over assumptions of global growth

Commentators have confused cause with effect when analysing this month’s sudden downturn in financial markets, as I describe in my latest post for the Financial Times, published on the BeyondBrics blog


Surprise and confusion seem to have been the main reactions to this month’s sudden downturn in western financial markets. Yet across the world in China, warning signs of a potential downturn have been building for some months, as discussed here in June.

As the chart below shows, President Xi Jinping’s decision to move away from stimulus policy will have a direct impact on the global economy, as this has been the main source of the liquidity that has boosted financial markets over the past decade.

China’s official and shadow bank lending totalled more than $20tn between 2009 and 2017. By comparison, the US Federal Reserve, Bank of Japan, European Central Bank and Bank of England added “only” $13tn between them.

The critical importance of China’s policy shift was highlighted in December by the state-owned Xinhua news service when it announced Mr Xi’s priorities for 2018 as being to fight “three tough battles” to secure China’s goal of “becoming a moderately prosperous society” by 2020.

“Financial deleveraging” was described as the first battle, and it seems the opening salvos have already been fired, given that China’s capital outflows collapsed from $640bn in 2016 to just $60bn in 2017.

The People’s Bank of China then reinforced this priority in January with a statement emphasising that “slower M2 growth than before will become the ‘new normal’, as the country’s deleveraging process deepens and the financial sector gets back to the function of serving the economy”.

Western financial markets, however, seemed to adopt the “Road Runner approach” to this major paradigm shift in economic policy. Like the cartoon character Wile E Coyote, the new year saw them continuing to hang in mid-air before finally realising they were about to plummet into the chasm.

Even more worrying, now calm has been temporarily restored, is their failure to learn from the experience. Instead, commentators have mostly gone back to their comfort zone and are again focusing on the minutiae of policy statements from the major western central banks.

This could prove a costly mistake for investors and companies. As the FT reported in December, Mr Xi has already “made controlling debt at state-owned enterprises a top policy priority”, and it seems likely he will follow the IMF’s advice by increasing budget constraints for China’s zombie companies and allowing more corporate defaults. January’s shadow bank lending was the lowest January level since 2009 at just $25bn, and it was 90 per cent lower than in January 2017.

The recent rush of asset sales by major Chinese corporates such as HNA and Dalian Wanda is another clear sign of the new discipline being imposed. Foreign investors must hope the companies realise a good return from these disposals, given that they provided $221bn in dollar-denominated loans to Chinese borrowers last year.

Deleveraging is only one of Mr Xi’s “three battles”, however. And while his second battle on poverty reduction is unlikely to impact the global economy, his third battle, the “War on Pollution”, has a number of potentially critical implications.

It has already led to thousands of company closures and forcible relocations, and has severely disrupted major parts of China’s economy — causing China’s producer price index to peak at 6.9 per cent in the fourth quarter. In turn (as we had forecast here in November), this surge has created today’s “inflation surprise” as its impact rippled round the world.

One key component of the “surprise” was the disruption caused by the unexpected loss of production in key commodity markets. Oil prices have surged, for example, as China’s move away from coal has powered a short-term increase in oil demand. And, as always, the surge has been boosted by the inventory build typically associated with such unexpected and sudden price hikes. This can be seen in the second chart, which focuses on volume changes in the chemicals market, normally an excellent leading indicator for the global economy.

It confirms that consumers put aside their initial scepticism over Opec’s ability to support the oil market, as China’s excess demand helped prices to rise 60 per cent from June’s $44 a barrel to January’s $71 peak. Purchasers scrambled to build stock ahead of likely price rises for their own raw materials.

This time round, it even led buyers to abandon their normal tactic of reducing stock at year-end to flatter working capital data. Instead, inventories rose quite sharply all down the value chains, creating the illusion that demand was suddenly increasing in a co-ordinated fashion around the world.

The world has seen many similar increases in such “apparent demand” over the years, and these can temporarily add up to an extra month’s demand to underlying levels. This increase is, of course, only a temporary effect, as it is quickly unwound again once prices start to stabilise. The chart also shows that this was already starting to happen in January, with the normal seasonal stock-build being replaced by destocking.

In turn, of course, these developments raise a major question mark over the current assumption that the world is now seeing a synchronised global recovery. We suspect that by the summer, policymakers may well find themselves repeating the famous lament of Stanley Fischer in August 2014, when the Fed’s vice-chairman sadly noted that “year after year we have had to explain from midyear on why the global growth rate has been lower than predicted as little as two quarters back”.

Paul Hodges, Daniël de Blocq van Scheltinga and Paul Satchell publish The pH Report.

The post China’s role in market volatility – Beijing’s shifting priorities raise questions over assumptions of global growth appeared first on Chemicals & The Economy.

The global economy and the US$ – an alternative view

Every New Year starts with optimism about the global economy.  But as Stanley Fischer, then vice chair of the US Federal Reserve, noted back in August 2014:

 “Year after year we have had to explain from mid-year on why the global growth rate has been lower than predicted as little as two quarters back.”

Will 2018 be any different?  Once again, the IMF and other forecasters have been lining up to tell us the long-awaited “synchronised global recovery” is now underway.  But at the same, they say they are puzzled that the US$ is so weak.  As the Financial Times headline asked:

“Has the US dollar stopped making sense?”

If the global economy was really getting stronger, then the US$ would normally be rising, not falling.  So could it be that the economy is not, actually, seeing the promised recovery?

OIL/COMMODITY PRICE INVENTORY BUILD HAS FOOLED THE EXPERTS, AGAIN
It isn’t hard to discover why the experts have been fooled.  Since June, we have been seeing the usual rise in “apparent demand” that always accompanies major commodity price rises.  Oil, after all, has already risen by 60%.

Contrary to economic theory, companies down the value chains always build inventory in advance of potential price rises.  Typically, this adds about 10% to real demand, equal to an extra month in the year.  Then, when the rally ends, companies destock again and “apparent demand” weakens again.

The two charts above confirm that the rally had nothing to do with a rise in “real demand”:

Their buying has powered the rise in oil prices, based on the free cash being handed out by the central banks, particularly in Europe and Japan, as part of their stimulus programmes.

They weren’t only buying oil, of course.  Most major commodities have also rallied.  Oil was particularly dramatic, however, as the funds had held record short positions till June.  Once they began to bet on a rally instead, prices had nowhere to go but up.  1.4bn barrels represents as astonishing 15 days of global oil demand, after all.

What has this to do with the US$, you might ask?  The answer is simply that hedge funds, as the name implies, like to go long in one market whilst going short on another.  And one of their favourite trades is going long (or short) on oil and commodities, whilst doing the opposite on the US$:

  • Since June, they have been happily going long on commodities
  • And as Reuters reports, they have also been opening major short positions on the dollar

The chart highlights the result, showing how the US$’s fall began just as oil/commodity prices began to rise.

COMPANIES HAVE NO CHOICE BUT TO BUILD INVENTORY WHEN COMMODITY PRICES RISE
This pattern has been going on for a long time.  But I have met very few economists or central bankers who recognise it.  They instead argue that markets are always efficient, as one professor told me recently:

“Economists would tend to be skeptical about concepts such as “apparent demand”. Unless this a secret concept (and it doesn’t seem like it is), other investors should also use it, and then the oil price should already reflect it. Thus, there wouldn’t be gains to be made (unless you’re quicker than everyone else or have inside information)…”

But if you were a purchasing manager in the real world, you wouldn’t be sceptical at all.  You would see prices rising for your key raw materials, and you would ask your CFO for some extra cash to build more inventory.  You would know that a rising oil, or iron, or other commodity price will soon push up the prices for your products.

And your CFO would agree, as would the CFOs of all the companies that you supply down the value chain.

So for the last 6 months, everyone who buys oil or other commodity-related products has been busy building as much inventory as they could afford.  In turn, of course, this has made it appear that demand has suddenly begun to recover.  At last, it seems, the “synchronised global recovery” has arrived.

Except, of course, that it hasn’t.  The hedge funds didn’t buy 15 days-worth of oil to use it.  They bought it to speculate, with the OPEC-Russia deal providing the essential “story” to support their buying binge.

THE RISE IN COMMODITY PRICES, AND “APPARENT DEMAND”, IS LIKELY COMING TO AN END
What happens next is, of course, the critical issue.  As we suggested in this month’s pH Report:

“This phenomenon of customers buying forward in advance of oil-price rises goes back to the first Arab Oil Crisis in 1973 – 1974. And yet every time it happens, the industry persuades itself “this time is different”, and that consumers are indeed simply buying to fill real demand. With Brent prices having nearly reached our $75/bbl target, we fear reality will dawn once again when prices stop rising.”

Forecasting, as the humorist Mark Twain noted, “is difficult, particularly about the future”.  But hedge funds aren’t known for being long-term players.  And with refinery maintenance season coming up in March, when oil demand takes a seasonal dip, it would be no surprise if they start to sell off some of their 1.4bn barrels.

No doubt many will also go short again, whilst going long the US$, as they did up to June.

In turn, “apparent demand” will then go into a decline as companies destock all down the value chain, and the US$ will rally again.  By Q3, current optimism over the “synchronised global recovery” will have disappeared.  And Stanley Fischer’s insight will have been proved right, once again.

The post The global economy and the US$ – an alternative view appeared first on Chemicals & The Economy.